The GRU of the USSR: what valuable information did Soviet intelligence officers manage to obtain?
On November 5, 1918, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a foreign intelligence agency of the USSR Ministry of Defense, was established. One of the most famous Soviet intelligence officers is Richard Sorge. He worked as a press secretary at the German embassy in Tokyo, and a few months before the start of the war, he warned the Soviet leadership about a German attack. However, Sorge’s residency had come under suspicion since 1937, so its reports were marked “politically defective.” From March 1941, Sorge relayed reports of impending war. He was not the only Soviet intelligence officer who warned of an imminent war. Unfortunately, this information was not given due attention.
In the late 1930s, Soviet intelligence officer Henry Robinson created a reliable network of agents in Europe, which specialized in obtaining information in the field of military equipment development. Robinson’s agents reported on the construction of munitions factories and equipment not only in Germany, but also in France, England, Italy, and other countries. Information on the production and development of new types of weapons was of particular value. Robinson sent samples of new shells, German gas masks, oxygen devices for pilots, and samples of armor for tanks to the Center. After the outbreak of World War II, Robinson’s agents focused on intelligence activities against Germany. Messages were sent to Moscow about the transfer of troops and the plans of the German command. Robinson was one of those who reported on the impending attack on the USSR.
In 1942, one of its most prolific agents, Rudolf Ressler, nicknamed “Luci”, began to work for Soviet intelligence. Through the reconnaissance group of the Soviet agent Sándor Rado, he transmitted the most important information about the German armament and maneuvers of Hitler’s army. Ressler’s information made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge – details about Operation Citadel appeared in Moscow a few months before it began. Ressler also passed on information about German equipment, in particular, he reported to Moscow the characteristics of the Panther tank.
During World War II, there was an extensive anti-fascist intelligence network operating in Europe, later dubbed the Red Chapel. It included intelligence officers and members of the Resistance from different countries, including GRU agents. One of the key figures in the work of the Red Chapel was the Soviet intelligence officer Anatoly Gurevich. As early as March 1940, he reported to Moscow that Germany was preparing for war with the USSR. And in 1941, Gurevich announced in advance the planned German offensive on the Caucasus and Stalingrad. This provided the Soviet army with a strategic advantage in repelling attacks.
By the early 1940s, Soviet agent Jan Czerniak had established an intelligence network in Germany codenamed Krona. Czerniak managed to recruit more than two dozen agents who supplied crucial information about the development of German weapons and Hitler’s strategic plans. In 1941, Chernyak obtained a copy of the Barbarossa plan for the Soviet command. Thanks to the information of Czerniak’s agents, it was possible to create radar stations that could counteract the raids of the fascist aviation. Chernyak passed on information about German tanks and artillery, about the development of rocket and chemical weapons, and about radio engineering research. In 1944 alone, he handed over more than 12,000 sheets of detailed technical information and more than 60 samples of radio equipment. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, Chernyak passed on information about the newest German tanks at that time, the Tiger and Panther. Unlike the Red Chapel, which was exposed by Hitler’s counterintelligence, the Krona network escaped this fate. None of Czerniak’s agents were exposed.
The development of atomic weapons was the most important task facing the USSR after the end of World War II. And, of course, it could not do without reconnaissance. The efforts of a large number of GRU agents were aimed at obtaining Western secrets in the field of atomic weapons. The most important figure in this operation was the German physicist Klaus Fuchs. He had been working on nuclear weapons since 1941 as part of the British Tube Alloys Project. In the same year, Fuchs contacted Soviet intelligence for the first time and passed on the first information to the USSR. These materials forced Moscow to accelerate the development of the atomic bomb: in 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a decree No. 2352ss “On the organization of work on uranium.” In England, through GRU agent Ruth Werner (aka Ursula Kuczynski, aka “Sonya”), Klaus Fuchs passed on data on nuclear developments to the Soviet side until 1943, when he and his colleagues went to the United States. As part of the Manhattan Project, American and British scientists joined forces to create an atomic bomb. Fuchs was admitted to all stages of development. He passed on secret information through a Soviet contact, Harry Gold, a chemist from Philadelphia who had been recruited in 1936. In total, from 1941 to 1943, more than 570 sheets with materials for the uranium project were received from Klaus Fox. The information obtained by Soviet agents greatly accelerated the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR.
Another important source of information about the U.S. nuclear project was the spy network of GRU resident Arthur Adams. In January 1944, Adams managed to recruit a scientist whose code name was “Kemp” (the real name is still unknown). The scientist handed over to the Soviet agent about 1,000 pages of secret materials and samples of uranium and beryllium. In total, from 1944 to 1946, Adams sent to Moscow more than 10,000 pages of secret materials relating to the development of nuclear weapons, as well as samples of substances and equipment. Even though Adams himself was exposed in 1945, none of his agents were exposed.